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This paper analyzes the role of institutions in the exporter’s country in 
promoting the exports. Firm-level evidence from 22 developing and 
transition countries is provided to show that institutions matter for 
complex goods. A poor legal system, weak contractual enforcement, 
and corruption significantly reduce complex goods exports. In contrast, 
the effect of such institutions on simple goods exports remains 
ambiguous. Our main results are robust to the use of different 
econometric methods. 
 
JEL Classification: D23, L14, O17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Ma (corresponding author): Department of Economics, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong. Tel: 
852-26167190, Fax: 852-28917940, Email: yuema@Ln.edu.hk. Qu: SKOLKOVO Institute for Emerging 
Market Studies (SIEMS), Moscow School of Management. Zhang: Department of Economics, Lingnan 
University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong. The authors are grateful for the constructive comments and suggestions 
by Nancy Chau (the guest editor) and two anonymous referees, which helped us to improve our paper 
substantially. We thank conference participants at the 2010 Second Annual Conference of IEFS China in 
Beijing and the 2010 Five Star Economics Forum in Beijing for their useful comments. We also wish to 
thank James Rauch for sending us the classification table and Cong Pham for sharing his Stata code with us 
to estimate the Eaton and Tamura (1994) Tobit model. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The relation between institutions and trade has been studied by many economists in 
recent years. One of the significant findings in this area of research is that an absence of 
contractual enforcement is one of the major obstacles to trade.1  In a recent study, 
Berkowitz, Moenius, and Pistor (2006) show how good institutions (located in the 
exporter’s country) can enhance international trade, especially trade in complex products. 
These highly differentiated products have many characteristics that cannot be fully 
stipulated in a contract. The authors argue that for complex goods, a country with good 
institutions will have both lower production costs and transaction costs. An improvement 
in the institutions in the exporting country will result in an increase in that country’s 
complex goods exports. Under balanced trade, a country with better institutions will tend 
to export more complex goods and import more simple goods. In contrast, the export of 
simple goods depends on the relative magnitude of the negative production costs effect 
and the positive transaction costs effect. This suggests that the effects of an improvement 
in the institutions quality of a country are ambiguous for the simple goods exports. 
Most of the existing studies (including Berkowitz et al., 2006) utilize country-
level institutional measures (country averages) to analyze the relation between 
institutional variables and trade at the country or country-industry level. However, 
various studies have demonstrated that there can be a significant degree of variation in 
institutions and law enforcement within a particular country.2  For example, Berkowitz 
and Clay (2006) show that the quality of state courts varies significantly across U.S. 
states and is persistently affected by the initial conditions of a state. Laeven and 
Woodruff (2007) find significant variation in the quality of the Mexican legal system 
across country. Acemoglu and Dell (2010) argue that both de jure and de facto 
institutions vary greatly within countries. Micro data analysis at firm-level that takes into 
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consideration variation in institutions and law enforcement within a country may 
therefore provide interesting empirical evidence that complements and enhances the 
existing country-level studies. As Acemoglu (2005) correctly points out, questions related 
to the importance of institutions “will be almost impossible to answer with cross-country 
data alone, and micro data investigations, for example, exploiting differences in 
regulations across markets and regions appear to be a most promising avenue” (p. 1045).3 
In this paper, we extend the study of Berkowitz et al. (2006) by providing firm-
level evidence on the link between institutions and trade of complex and simple goods. 
We focus on the within-country institutional effect by taking account of the striking 
heterogeneity of firm-level characteristics and institutions. Based on the analysis of a 
World Bank firm-level survey data from 22 developing and transition countries, we find 
that a poor legal system, weak contractual enforcement, and corruption in an exporter’s 
country significantly reduce complex goods exports. However, the effect of institutions 
on simple goods exports remains ambiguous, a result that is consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of Berkowitz et al. (2006). Our main results are robust to the use 
of different econometric methods including SUR and instrumental variable (IV) 
estimations, and different ways to deal with the zero exports. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our estimation 
procedure. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 reports the empirical results and 
Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Econometric Model and Hypotheses 
We follow the well-established literature on firm level exports to estimate our 
econometric model (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999, 2004).  Institutional variables are 
added to augment the baseline estimation model adopted in prior empirical studies in the 
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literature on heterogeneous firms and trade.4 Since the dependent variable (export volume) 
is a variable that takes the value of zero with positive probability, a Tobit model is used 
for the firm-level export equation. The basic estimation model is specified as follows: 
qi = f(agei,  sizei, labor productivityi, wagei, R&Di, institutional variablesi)       (1) 
where i denotes firm i . We define export volume as qi = ln(exporti +A) to avoid taking 
the log of zero for non-exporting firms, while A is a parameter estimated by the Tobit 
model (Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Rauch, 1999). age is firm age, size is firm size 
approximated by the log employment level, labor productivity is the logarithm of labor 
productivity, wage is log wage rate, R&D is the log of one plus expenditure on R&D, and 
institutional variables are the institutional barrier indices at the firm level. Following the 
previous literature (e.g., Bernard and Jensen, 1999), the explanatory variables of firm 
characteristics are lagged by one year.5 A full set of country dummies and industry 
dummies are also included in the estimation to control for unobserved factors that may 
also affect the firm’s exports. 
Our study focuses on the effects of institutional barriers in the exporter’s 
environment on its export volume. Following Berkowitz et al. (2006), we argue that firms 
operate in different institutional environments even within the same country. Therefore 
they are subject to different institutional barriers that may affect their production costs 
and transaction costs. These factors will in turn have an impact on firm exports. We 
therefore posit that institutional barriers in the exporter’s environment are negatively 
related to the export volume of the firm, i.e., we expect negative coefficients for the 
institutional variables. We also hypothesize that the effects of institutional barriers on 
exports of complex goods and simple goods will differ. Whilst we expect negative 
coefficients on the institutional variables for complex goods, the signs of the coefficients 
on the institutional variables for simple goods may be ambiguous.6 According to 
5 
 
Berkowitz et al. (2006), this ambiguity is due to two offsetting forces. On the one hand, 
good institutional quality may reduce the transaction costs faced by firms and therefore 
promotes exports of simple goods.  On the other hand, good institutions may also build 
up a comparative advantage in the production of complex goods and hence induces firms 
to engage export activity in complex goods at the expense of simple goods production. 
The net effect on simple goods exports is therefore an empirical question. 
 
3. The Data 
Institutions and Firm Characteristics 
Our firm-level data are taken from the cross-sectional database compiled from the World 
Bank Enterprise Survey. The World Bank randomly surveyed over 10,000 firms from 81 
countries during the period 2002 to 2005. Each firm in the dataset was surveyed once in 
one particular year during this period. This database covers business perceptions and 
dozens of indicators on the quality of the business environment at the firm level. One of 
its advantages is that the surveys were conducted by the same organization (the World 
Bank) using the same methodology, thus ensuring a high degree of comparability across 
countries. In addition, the database covers a large number of small-to-medium sized firms 
(most of which are unlisted), a cohort that is often neglected by other studies. Due to 
missing observations in some key variables, the sample size in our paper is reduced to 
about 5,000 firms from 22 developing and transition countries (see Part (a)  
of Table 1 for a list of the 22 countries represented in our sample).  
The firms’ perceptions of the institutional barriers they face are best indicated by 
their responses to the following survey questions:7 
(i) Quality of legal system: “legal system obstacle” (survey question 218r). The 
firm’s response measures the severity of the legal obstacles it faces to its operation and 
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growth. The five responses from which respondents can choose range from 0 (‘no 
obstacle’) to 4 (‘very severe obstacle’), 
(ii) Contractual enforcement: “percentage of sales to government agencies or 
state-owned enterprises involving overdue payments” (survey question 247c). A high 
percentage of overdue payments indicates weaker contractual enforcement, 
(iii) Corruption: “corruption obstacle” (survey question 218o). The response to 
this question indicates the level of corruption in the firm’s home country. As for the first 
question, the five responses from which respondents can choose range from 0 (‘no 
obstacle’) to 4 (‘very severe obstacle’). 
It is clear that improvements in all the three aspects of the institutional quality will 
reduce transaction costs and build a strong comparative advantage in the production of 
complex goods. Thus we expect a negative relation between these institutional barrier 
variables and complex goods exports. In contrast, the effects of institutional barrier on 
simple goods may not be so clear-cut. Among the three institutional variables, 
improvement on the two of them, i.e., “overdue payments by government agencies or 
SOEs” and “corruption”, among the countries included in our sample will reduce the 
transaction costs incurred by firms that produce simple goods (a negative relation), since 
improvements on these two indicators of government institutions protect firm assets from 
appropriation by the government and SOEs. However, a general reduction in the third 
variable − “legal system obstacle” − may lead to specialization towards the production 
and hence export complex goods. That may lower the exports of simple goods. These 
hypotheses will be put into tests in our empirical study. 
Table 1 reports the sample distribution across countries and the summary statistics 
of the key variables. It shows that institutional barriers vary significantly at the firm 
7 
 
level.8 The World Bank Enterprise Survey also provides detailed information for firms 
such as sales, employment, ownership, corporate governance, location, and R&D.  
[INSERT Table 1 here] 
[INSERT Table 2 here] 
 
Classification of Complex and Simple Goods 
We classify goods into complex and simple goods in line with Rauch (1999).9 The World 
Bank Enterprise Survey reports firm’s industry according to the four-digit ISIC industry 
codes. Based on a concordance table provided by the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities,10 we are able to link the ISIC code identified in the enterprise survey to the 
four-digit SITC code in the classification table provided by Rauch (1999). Rauch (1999) 
has two classification methods: liberal and conservative. We adopt the conservative 
method.11 Rauch (1999) classifies four-digit SITC industries into three categories: (1) 
goods that are traded on organized exchanges, (2) goods that are reference-priced, and (3) 
goods that are not traded on organized exchanges and do not have reference prices. We 
regard category (1) as simple goods and category (3) as complex goods. Part (b) of Table 
1 and Table 2 report the summary statistics and correlations for the key variables for the 
firms that produce complex and simple goods. 
 
4. Regression Results 
Baseline Regressions 
To deal with zero export value problem, we estimate equation (1) with Tobit model. We 
report the Tobit regression results using the full sample (all goods) in Table 3. The 
dependent variable is the logarithm of export volume plus A, while A is a parameter 
estimated by the Tobit model (Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Rauch, 1999; Martin and Pham, 
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2008).12 Throughout the paper, we report p-values that are based on White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error and are corrected for industry-country 
clustering. Column 1 of Table 3 reports the estimation result when none of the 
institutional variables are included. Our finding generally supports the heterogeneous 
firm theory (e.g., Melitz, 2003) whereby export activities are positively correlated with 
the firm’s productivity. We find that firms that are more productive, younger, and larger, 
pay higher wages, and spend more on R&D tend to export more. In columns 2 to 4, we 
add the institutional variables one by one. All three institutional variables have a negative 
and statistically significant coefficient (at the 5% level). The results remain unchanged 
when we include all three institutional variables together in the same regression (see the 
last column of Table 3). These results indicate that institutional barriers are negatively 
associated with firm exports after controlling for other firm characteristics, a conclusion 
that is consistent with our hypotheses. The effect of the institutional variables on exports 
is also quantitatively significant. Columns 5, for example, shows that a one standard 
deviation increase in the legal system obstacle, the percentage of overdue payments, and 
corruption corresponds to a 26%, 26%, and 26% decrease in export volume, respectively. 
This implies that the impacts of institutional quality on exports are also economically 
significant. 
[INSERT Table 3 here] 
 
Complex Goods vs. Simple Goods 
In this subsection, we re-estimate the export model for complex and simple goods 
separately. The results are reported in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively. Similar to the 
regression results reported in Table 3, in the regressions with complex goods (Table 4), 
the coefficients of the institutional variables are all negative and statistically significant 
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(at the 5% level). This result is consistent with the theoretical arguments of Berkowitz et 
al. (2006). The existence of high quality institutions in exporting countries may reduce 
transaction costs and build a strong comparative advantage in the production of complex 
goods, thereby increasing complex goods exports. 
[INSERT Table 4 here] 
[INSERT Table 5 here] 
Turning to simple goods exports equation, the coefficient of legal system obstacle 
variable is positive and statistically significant; whilst the coefficients of the other two 
institutional variables are significantly negative (Table 5). We thus provide direct 
evidence supporting the “ambiguity theory” discussed by Berkowitz et al. (2006). Our 
empirical findings confirm that improvements on those two institutional quality 
indicators of “overdue payments by government agencies or SOEs” and “corruption” 
directly reduce the transaction costs of simple goods production. Thus there is a negative 
relationship with exports of simple goods. In addition to the possible appropriation of 
firm assets by the government and SOEs, such assets may be appropriated by other firms 
in the market, a type of behavior that can be eradicated only when good legal institutions 
exist.  
Our finding of a positive relationship between simple goods exports and the “legal 
system obstacle” indicator implies that if the quality of legal institutions would be 
improved (i.e., of the obstacle posed by the legal system can be reduced), it would lead to 
the development of a comparative advantage in complex goods production. This would 
result in a redirection of resources used to produce simple goods to complex goods 
production activities. As a result, complex goods may account for a larger proportion of 
exports. This specialization effect is more eminent in the case of “legal system obstacle” 
indicator than the other two indicators. This suggests that compared to the possible 
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appropriation of firm assets by the government and SOEs, the severity of the legal 
obstacles a firm faces in its operation and growth is a more important determinant of 
whether the firm could develop an advantage in complex goods export. 
Another interesting finding from the comparison of Table 4 and Table 5 is that the 
absolute magnitudes of the coefficients of all three institutional variables in complex 
goods are larger than those of the simple goods. This result is consistent with Berkowitz 
et al. (2006) since both direct transaction cost and specialization effects work in the same 
direction in the case of complex goods.13 
 
Robustness Check – SUR Estimation 
The equations for complex goods and simple goods are estimated separately in the above 
models. The estimation results may be biased if the error terms in the two equations are 
somehow correlated. To deal with this concern, we estimate two Tobit equations as a 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) (Zellner, 1962). The estimation results are reported 
in Table 6. Our main results are robust to the use of this alternative econometric method. 
Regarding the institutional variables, the coefficients remain statistically significant at the 
5% level after adjusting the standard errors. 
[INSERT Table 6 here] 
 
Instrumental Variable Estimation 
Using a firm-level measure of institutions may introduce endogeneity in the form of 
omitted variables bias. For instance, there could be some missing variables (e.g., 
favorable industrial policy) that correlate with both firm-level institution measures and 
the exports of firms. In our estimation model, we introduced a host of firm characteristics 
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used in previous research, as well as a full set of industry and country dummies to 
minimize the possible endogeneity problem related to omitted variables. 
Another possible source of endogeneity is reverse causality. While the existing 
empirical literature gives good support to the proposition that good governance causes 
better economic performance (Dixit, 2004), there has also been argument that the 
causation could run in both directions: not only do good institutions cause trade, but trade 
opportunities may also lead to good institutions. For instance, Dollar and Kraay (2002) 
report a positive correlation between openness and trade, implying a two-way causation 
between them. Anderson (2007) develops a theoretical model to show that trade fosters 
contractual enforcement. 
To deal with this endogeneity concern, it is standard practice to use instruments 
for different aspects of institutional quality. Previous research has utilized various 
instrumental variables at country level including, among others, legal origins (e.g., Hayek, 
1960; La Porta et al., 1998; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Nunn, 2007) and European 
settler mortality rate (Acemoglu et al., 2001). However, the country-level instrumental 
variables cannot be used in our study since we have already included a full set of country 
dummies. 
Following Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), we use average values of 
institutional barriers reported by other firms in the same industry and same country as 
instruments for our firm-level institutional barrier variables. Thus our instruments are 
firm-specific. These instruments are valid if the institutional variables of the firms in the 
same industry are correlated since they may face common regulation shocks. To the 
extent that industry-level variables are exogenous to the firms, we can use these 
instruments to purge the endogenous components of firm-level institutional barrier 
variables. Since we have three measures of the institutional barriers (legal obstacle, 
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overdue payments, and corruption), we have a just indentified case with three 
instrumental variables. 
Table 7 reports the results of the Tobit regressions with the abovementioned 
instrumental variables (IV) for institution quality. First-stage F-statistics indicate that our 
instruments correlate with institutional barrier variables. The IV estimation results are 
consistent with our previous findings. The coefficients of institutional barriers are close 
to those reported in Table 3 to 5. Again we find opposite signs of “legal obstacle” on the 
exports of simple goods. This gives us additional confidence that our main findings are 
robust.  
[INSERT Table 7 here] 
 
Further Robustness Checks 
In this sub-section, we conduct various robustness checks with different model 
specifications.  
Since 63.4% of firms in our sample do not export, as a robustness check, we use 
alternative methods to deal with the issue of zero trade values. Table 8 reports the 
estimation results of Heckman selection model (Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein, 2008), 
Poisson model (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2007), and OLS estimation with a subsample 
of only exporters.  The Heckman selection model requires a variable that affects fixed 
trade cost (extensive margin) but not variable trade cost (intensive margin). We use the 
variable “Licensing obstacles” from Question 218j of the World Bank survey as the 
exclusion restrictions for the two-stage estimation. The response measures the severity of 
the obstacles from business licensing and operation permits to the firms’ business. 
Table 8 shows that our main estimation results are not sensitive to the use of 
different econometric models. Nevertheless, the quantitative effects are not exactly the 
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same in these models. For example, columns (2), (5) and (7) indicate that, a one-standard 
deviation increase in “legal obstacle” is associated with a reduction of complex goods 
exports by 23%, 34% and 28%, respectively. All these institutional effects on complex 
goods exports remain economically significant. 
[INSERT Table 8 here] 
In addition, since some explanatory variables such as labor productivity and wage 
rates are closely correlated, we carry out furthers tests to see if such correlations may 
affect our estimation results. Table 9 reports the estimation results when wage rates and 
labor productivity are included individually in the regression models. Our main results 
remain unchanged.    
[INSERT Table 9 here] 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines the effects of institutional quality on firm-level exports in 
transitional and developing countries. Based on an analysis of a cross-sectional database 
compiled by the World Bank Enterprise Survey of firms from 22 developing countries in 
the period 2002 to 2005, we find strong empirical firm-level evidence that good 
institutions increase complex goods exports. However, we find that the effect of 
institutional quality on exports of simple goods is ambiguous. Whilst our firm-level 
analysis shows that an improvement in the legal enforcement of overdue payments by 
government agencies or SOEs and a reduction in the level of corruption leads to an 
increase in simple goods exports, we find that an improvement in the overall level of 
legal protection for firms by itself results in a comparative advantage in complex goods 
production and reduces exports of simple goods. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
(a) List of countries in the sample (22)    
Country No. of firms Country No. of firms Country No. of firms 
Benin  33 Madagascar  151 South Africa  471 
Brazil  1510 Malawi  39 Tajikistan  43 
Cambodia  19 Mali  44 Uzbekistan  81 
Costa Rica  248 Mauritius  117 Zambia  76 
El Salvador  461 Moldova  75   
Guatemala  432 Nicaragua  440   
Honduras  421 Oman  61   
Indonesia  18 Poland  67   
Kyrgyzstan  75 Senegal  66 Total 4,948 
 
(b) Firm characteristics      
Variable No. of firms Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A. All goods 
Exporter dummy 4,948 0.366 0.482 0 1 
Exports ('000 US$) 4,948 316 728 0 8,460 
Labor productivity (US$ per labor) 4,948 2,932 5,316 322 24,117 
Firm age (year) 4,948 20.1 16.9 1 77 
Wage rate (US$) 4,948 703 862 12.7 7,582 
Employment 4,948 289 506 9 18,753 
R&D ('000 US$) 4,948 48.6 66.8 0 6,402 
Legal obstacle 4,948 1.41 1.43 0 4 
Overdue payments by government or SOEs (%) 4,948 3.23 15.34 0 100 
Corruption 4,948 2.34 1.56 0 4 
Panel B. Complex goods      
Exporter dummy 3,765 0.366 0.482 0 1 
Exports ('000 US$) 3,765 340 721 0 8,460 
Labor productivity (US$ per labor) 3,765 3,139 5,374 673 24,117 
Firm age (year) 3,765 20.7 16.7 1 77 
Wage rate (US$) 3,765 745 917 27.5 7,582 
Employment 3,765 281 498 9 12,500 
R&D ('000 US$) 3,765 56.0 73.4 0 6,402 
Legal obstacle 3,765 1.24 1.21 0 4 
Overdue payments by government or SOEs (%) 3,765 3.12 15.16 0 100 
Corruption 3,765 2.18 1.52 0 4 
Panel C. Simple goods      
Exporter dummy 1,183 0.367 0.482 0 1 
Exports ('000 US$) 1,183 239 745 0 7,823 
Labor productivity (US$ per labor) 1,183 2,273 5,070 322 8,412 
Firm age (year) 1,183 18.2 17.2 1 72 
Wage rate (US$) 1,183 569 639 12.7 5,725 
Employment 1,183 313 528 12 18,753 
R&D ('000 US$) 1,183 25.0 28.1 0 3,250 
Legal obstacle 1,183 1.98 1.85 0 4 
Overdue payments by government or SOEs (%) 1,183 3.58 15.90 0 100 
Corruption 1,183 2.85 1.59 0 4 
 
Notes: The sample size for each country is constrained by the joint availability of observations of the firm 
characteristics and legal obstacle variables in the World Bank survey data.  
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Table 2. Correlation Matrices 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Panel A. All goods 
1 Log(exports+A) 1 
2 Log(labor 
productivity) 0.381** 1       
3 Firm age (year) -0.179* 0.102** 1 
4 Log(wage rate) 0.225** 0.382** 0.086 1 
5 Log(employment) 0.388** 0.285** 0.269* 0.187* 1 
6 Log(R&D) 0.337** 0.271** 0.171 0.240** 0.105* 1 
7 Legal obstacle -0.102** -0.061* 0.031 -0.020 -0.112 -0.104 1 
8 Overdue payments 
by government or 
SOEs (%) 
-0.148** -0.047 0.005 -0.036* -0.017 -0.032 0.050* 1 
9 Corruption -0.113*** -0.003* -0.035 -0.047 -0.043* -0.005 0.106** 0.049* 
Panel B. Complex goods 
1 Log(exports+A) 1 
2 Log(labor 
productivity) 0.381** 1       
3 Firm age (year) -0.199** 0.143** 1 
4 Log(wage rate) 0.276** 0.403** 0.106 1 
5 Log(employment) 0.228** 0.351** 0.264* 0.255* 1 
6 Log(R&D) 0.385** 0.346*** 0.191 0.249** 0.230* 1 
7 Legal obstacle -0.207*** -0.072* 0.018 0.051** -0.089 -0.101 1 
8 Overdue payments 
by government or 
SOEs (%) 
-0.172** -0.042 0.004 -0.043 -0.009 -0.048 0.065* 1 
9 Corruption -0.124** -0.011* -0.048 -0.037 -0.054* -0.009 0.118** 0.048* 
Panel C. Simple goods 
1 Log(exports+A) 1 
2 Log(labor 
productivity) 0.380** 1       
3 Firm age (year) -0.130* 0.02 1 
4 Log(wage rate) 0.170** 0.307** 0.053 1 
5 Log(employment) 0.390*** 0.156** 0.284* 0.077* 1 
6 Log(R&D) 0.117 0.141 0.105 0.124 0.133 1 
7 Legal obstacle 0.104** -0.048 0.072 -0.048 -0.186** -0.104 1 
8 Overdue payments 
by government or 
SOEs (%) 
-0.118** -0.077 0.009 -0.011** -0.024 -0.003 0.006 1 
9 Corruption -0.109*** -0.004** 0.007 -0.052 -0.009* -0.047 0.159** 0.051 
 
Notes: *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Determinants of Export Volume (All Goods) 
 
Tobit model 
 Dependent variable: log ( A + export volume) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Legal obstacle -0.157 -0.114 
[0.035]** [0.038]** 
Overdue payments -0.018 -0.017 
[0.011]** [0.028]** 
Corruption -0.143 -0.167 
[0.003]*** [0.012]** 
Log (labor productivity) 0.914 0.914 0.910 0.913 0.909 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Firm age -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.014 
[0.031]** [0.053]* [0.033]** [0.062]* [0.029]** 
Log (wage rate) 0.186 0.185 0.187 0.185 0.184 
[0.020]** [0.023]** [0.024]** [0.021]** [0.022]** 
Log (employment) 1.257 1.256 1.257 1.249 1.248 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Log (R&D expenditure) 0.150 0.159 0.156 0.149 0.153 
[0.018]** [0.017]** [0.015]** [0.016]** [0.014]** 
A 23.159 23.204 23.291 23.207 23.245 
[0.029]** [0.031]** [0.028]** [0.030]** [0.029]** 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 4,948 4,948 4,948 4,948 4,948 
Pseudo R2 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.154 0.155 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log (A + export volume). A is a parameter estimated by the 
Tobit model (Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Rauch, 1999). P-values are in brackets and are based on 
the White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, which are corrected for country-industry 
clustering. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 4. Determinants of Export Volume (Complex Goods) 
 
Tobit model 
 Dependent variable: log ( A + export volume ) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Legal obstacle -0.171 -0.125 
[0.017]** [0.018]** 
Overdue payments -0.021 -0.020 
[0.006]*** [0.017]** 
Corruption -0.181 -0.185 
[0.006]*** [0.003]*** 
Log (labor productivity) 0.928 0.929 0.924 0.923 0.919 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Firm age -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 
[0.056]* [0.036]** [0.032]** [0.051]* [0.056]* 
Log (wage rate) 0.222 0.223 0.221 0.209 0.208 
[0.037]** [0.036]** [0.035]** [0.036]** [0.033]** 
Log (employment) 1.232 1.231 1.232 1.225 1.224 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Log (R&D expenditure) 0.171 0.174 0.179 0.170 0.174 
[0.011]** [0.012]** [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*** 
A 22.118 22.063 22.340 22.244 22.242 
[0.029]** [0.030]** [0.027]** [0.028]** [0.029]** 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765 
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.172 
 
Note: Same as in Table 3. 
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Table 5. Determinants of Export Volume (Simple Goods) 
 
Tobit model 
 Dependent variable: log ( A + export volume ) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Legal obstacle 0.089 0.104 
[0.036]** [0.025]** 
Overdue payments -0.011 -0.010 
[0.023]** [0.019]** 
Corruption -0.118 -0.105 
[0.012]** [0.030]** 
Log (labor productivity) 0.773 0.780 0.779 0.793 0.800 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Firm age -0.023 -0.020 -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 
[0.012]** [0.053]* [0.028]** [0.062]* [0.040]** 
Log (wage rate) 0.070 0.073 0.072 0.069 0.070 
[0.094]* [0.064]* [0.085]* [0.073]* [0.081]* 
Log (employment) 1.263 1.268 1.264 1.260 1.264 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Log (R&D expenditure) 0.070 0.085 0.086 0.074 0.071 
[0.276] [0.264] [0.352] [0.272] [0.337] 
A 25.993 26.152 25.735 25.817 25.694 
[0.029]** [0.027]** [0.028]** [0.029]** [0.028]** 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 
Pseudo R2 0.135 0.135 0.136 0.137 0.137 
 
Note: Same as in Table 3.
Table 6. Tobit SUR Estimation of Complex Goods and Simple Goods 
Tobit SUR (seemingly unrelated regressions) 
     
  Complex goods   Simple goods  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Legal obstacle -0.171 -0.125 0.089 0.104 
[0.016]** [0.017]** [0.036]** [0.025]** 
Overdue payments -0.021 -0.020 -0.011 -0.010 
[0.005]*** [0.016]** [0.024]** [0.019]** 
Corruption -0.181 -0.185 -0.118 -0.105 
[0.006]*** [0.003]*** [0.012]** [0.030]** 
Log (labor productivity) 0.929 0.924 0.923 0.919 0.780 0.779 0.793 0.800 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Firm age -0.014 -0.013 -0.012 -0.014 -0.020 -0.023 -0.023 -0.022 
[0.036]** [0.031]** [0.050]* [0.055]* [0.051]* [0.027]** [0.060]* [0.038]** 
Log (wage rate) 0.223 0.221 0.209 0.208 0.073 0.072 0.069 0.070 
[0.036]** [0.035]** [0.036]** [0.033]** [0.101] [0.083]* [0.142] [0.124] 
Log (employment) 1.231 1.232 1.225 1.224 1.268 1.264 1.260 1.264 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Log (R&D expenditure) 0.174 0.179 0.170 0.174 0.085 0.086 0.074 0.071 
[0.013]** [0.006]*** [0.008]*** [0.007]*** [0.262] [0.351] [0.271] [0.336] 
A 22.063 22.340 22.244 22.242 26.152 25.735 25.817 25.694 
[0.030]** [0.027]** [0.028]** [0.030]** [0.027]** [0.028]** [0.029]** [0.028]** 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 
Pseudo R2 0.171 0.171 0.171 0.172 0.135 0.136 0.137 0.137 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log (A + export volume). A is a parameter estimated by the Tobit model (Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Rauch, 1999).  The 
Tobit seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) includes a full set of industry and country dummies. The p-values are based on the White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors, which are corrected for country-industry clustering. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 
IV Tobit regressions 
  All goods   Complex goods   Simple goods  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Legal obstacle -0.187 -0.125 -0.167 -0.132 0.103 0.118 
[0.032]** [0.034]** [0.021]** [0.018]** [0.032]** [0.029]** 
Overdue payments -0.018 -0.017   -0.027 -0.019   -0.016 -0.013 
[0.037]** [0.022]**   [0.029]** [0.031]**   [0.028]** [0.024]** 
Corruption -0.178 -0.167   -0.189 -0.170   -0.115 -0.107 
[0.025]** [0.019]**   [0.016]** [0.021]**   [0.014]** [0.026]** 
Log (labor productivity) 0.823 0.791 0.807 0.762 0.978 0.874 0.827 0.905 0.754 0.771 0.789 0.738 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Firm age -0.016 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 -0.017 -0.012 -0.016 -0.014 -0.016 -0.013 -0.012 -0.015 
[0.034]** [0.036]** [0.073]* [0.033]** [0.038]** [0.034]** [0.071]* [0.086]* [0.072]* [0.035]** [0.027]** [0.032]** 
Log (wage rate) 0.156 0.166 0.164 0.159 0.217 0.235 0.270 0.218 0.021 0.020 0.031 0.049 
[0.039]** [0.067]* [0.013]** [0.062]* [0.016]** [0.031]** [0.083]* [0.040]** [0.261] [0.182] [0.088]* [0.063]* 
Log (employment) 1.213 1.091 1.119 1.142 1.235 1.067 0.997 1.152 1.132 1.244 1.261 1.141 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Log (R&D expenditure) 0.117 0.150 0.169 0.158 0.134 0.190 0.169 0.161 0.088 0.063 0.073 0.085 
[0.012]** [0.016]** [0.004]*** [0.017]** [0.005]*** [0.007]*** [0.012]** [0.023]** [0.268] [0.387] [0.321] [0.438] 
A 23.434 15.220 23.027 23.133 22.397 11.677 20.063 22.184 25.388 26.902 26.280 25.130 
[0.031]** [0.027]** [0.026]** [0.038]** [0.035]** [0.028]** [0.034]** [0.031]** [0.019]** [0.027]** [0.026]** [0.029]** 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 4,948 4,948 4,948 4,948 3,765 3,765 3,765 3,765 1,183 1,183 1,183 1,183 
1st-stage F-test (p-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Pseudo R2 0.215 0.244 0.220 0.156 0.217 0.220 0.210 0.173 0.212 0.142 0.139 0.140 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log(A + export volume). A is a parameter estimated by the Tobit model (Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Rauch, 1999).  The instrumental variables (IV) are the 
average values of the domestic industry that the firm belongs to (excluding the value of the firm itself) corresponding to their firm-level institutional variables: legal obstacle, overdue payments, 
and corruption. The 1st-stage F-test is the test of excluded IV in the 1st-stage regression. P-values are in brackets and are based on the White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, 
which are corrected for industry-country clustering. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. Robustness tests 
 
  Heckman  model  Poisson model OLS model 
 Complex goods  Simple goods Complex goods Simple goods Complex goods Simple goods 
 1st-stage 2nd-stage  1st-stage 2nd-stage     
Dependent variable Export dummy Log(export  Export dummy Log(export Export volume Log(export volume) 
1 2  3 4 5 6 7 8 
Legal obstacle -0.177 -0.187  0.104 0.123 -0.170 0.116 -0.198 0.127 
[0.012]** [0.019]**  [0.027]** [0.021]** [0.002]*** [0.018]** [0.007]*** [0.021]** 
Overdue payments -0.023 -0.028  -0.011 -0.015 -0.023 -0.012 -0.024 -0.014 
[0.016]** [0.007]***  [0.015]** [0.027]** [0.009]*** [0.014]** [0.024]** [0.025]** 
Corruption -0.178 -0.214  -0.122 -0.179 -0.231 -0.184 -0.221 -0.181 
[0.021]** [0.016]**  [0.024]** [0.018]** [0.006]*** [0.012]** [0.017]** [0.019]** 
Log (labor productivity) 0.182 0.992  0.098 0.854 1.029 0.735 0.983 0.850 
[0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.036]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Firm age -0.012 -0.017  -0.013 -0.022 -0.017 -0.049 -0.018 -0.022 
[0.020]** [0.021]**  [0.037]** [0.035]** [0.025]** [0.016]** [0.014]** [0.017]** 
Log (wage rate) 0.078 0.247  0.068 0.122 0.291 0.120 0.211 0.132 
[0.016]** [0.031]**  [0.021]** [0.017]** [0.022]** [0.011]** [0.038]** [0.026]** 
Log (employment) 0.517 1.092  0.461 1.281 0.824 0.939 1.074 1.259 
[0.000]*** [0.000]***  [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Log (R&D expenditure) 0.073 0.214  0.024 0.073 0.203 0.088 0.216 0.083 
[0.000]*** [0.006]***  [0.424] [0.241] [0.003]*** [0.340] [0.000]*** [0.208] 
Licensing obstacles -0.026   -0.014      
 [0.017]**   [0.026]**      
ρ (inverse Mill’s ratio)  0.387   0.251     
  [0.014]**   [0.032]**     
Exclusive restriction test:          
Licensing obstacles (p-value)   0.455  0.703     
Country fixed effects yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes  yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 3,765 3,765  1,183 1,183 3,765 1,183 1,378 434 
Pseudo R2 0.277   0.263      
Adjusted R2   0.438  0.547 0.583 0.598 0.535 0.534 
 
Notes: The dependent variables are indicated at the heading of each column. The p-values are based on the White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, which are 
corrected for country-industry clustering. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 9: Additional Robustness Tests  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Tobit model All goods Complex goods Simple goods 
 drop out wage 
drop out 
productivity
drop out 
wage 
drop out 
productivity
drop out  
wage 
drop out 
productivity
Legal obstacle -0.123 -0.106 -0.104 -0.116 0.083 0.094 
[0.039]** [0.032]** [0.011]** [0.005]*** [0.026]** [0.032]** 
Overdue payments -0.017 -0.019 -0.020 -0.021 -0.011 -0.010 
[0.012]** [0.014]** [0.007]*** [0.005]*** [0.017]** [0.018]** 
Corruption -0.159 -0.153 -0.187 -0.174 -0.102 -0.112 
[0.024]** [0.015]** [0.003]*** [0.001]*** [0.021]** [0.029]** 
Log (labor productivity) 0.947 0.965 0.883 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Firm age -0.016 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.022 -0.028 
[0.031]** [0.282] [0.035]** [0.094]* [0.053]* [0.036]** 
Log (wage rate) 0.242 0.344 0.179 
[0.024]** [0.026]** [0.017]** 
Log (employment) 1.248 1.427 1.225 1.414 1.275 1.446 
[0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]***
Log (R&D expenditure) 0.126 0.176 0.159 0.194 0.050 0.089 
[0.004]*** [0.000]*** [0.006]*** [0.000]*** [0.309] [0.152] 
A 23.265 23.929 22.333 23.778 24.894 26.714 
[0.030]** [0.021]** [0.016]** [0.012]** [0.026]** [0.023]** 
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 4,948 4,948 3,765 3,765 1,183 1,183 
Pseudo R2 0.154 0.141 0.171 0.156 0.137 0.130 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log (A + export volume). A is a parameter estimated by the 
Tobit model (Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Rauch, 1999). Tobit regressions include a full set of 
industry and country dummies. P-values are in brackets and are based on the White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, which are corrected for country-industry clustering. *, 
**, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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